

## NOTES

1. This is a revised version of "Love and Liberty," a paper presented at the *Free Inquiry* Conference on Humanism and Liberty, Boston, November 4, 1990. Although I do not share Jan Narveson's self-interest theory of relationships, I am indebted to him for several valuable suggestions.

2. By limiting my analysis to adult love, I hope to reduce the need of addressing the question of caring for others, especially children, by helping them grow and actualize themselves. Contrary to a venerable tradition, children seem more vulnerable to paternalism, especially its more subtle or suffocating forms, because they are in the process of self-determination, of forming their own values and ideals. I am not suggesting that in adulthood or even in late adulthood this process is necessarily complete. I only wish to suggest that many adults seem less vulnerable to control and more capable of protecting their own values and life plans.

3. Alan Soble, "Analyzing Love," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 19 (1989): 493.

4. My characterization of caring love largely follows Bertrand Russell (*What I Believe* [London: Kegan Paul, 1925], pp. 28-42). Robert Sternberg, on the other hand, maintains that there is a cluster of human relationships which can be measured and better understood by using (but not only using) scales of liking and love. Sternberg suggests that love can be understood best in terms of three components: intimacy, passion, and decision/commitment. Using these components, he distinguishes eight kinds of love, including consummate love. Consummate love (i.e., the combination of all three components) seems to be akin to what I have been calling caring love. The difficulty is that what is purported to be consummate love is a matter of degree and is, therefore, not necessarily consummate. The reason seems to be that intimacy and commitment, in themselves or when they are only minimally present, are not synonymous with caring and being strongly disposed to help actively. See Robert J. Sternberg, "The Nature of Love," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 47, no. 2 (1984): 312-29; "Liking Versus Loving: A Comparative Evaluation of Theories," *Psychological Bulletin* 102, no. 3 (1987): 331-45; *The Triangle of Love* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

5. Diane Vaughan, *Uncoupling: Turning Points in Intimate Relationships* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 13.

6. Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, trans. Philip S. Watson (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 91.

7. Irving Singer, *The Modern World*, vol. 3 of *The Nature of Love* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 391.

8. Sternberg, *Triangle of Love*, p. 46.

9. Singer, *Nature of Love*, p. 393.

10. Personal correspondence, November 29, 1990.

11. Carol Gilligan, "Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of the Self in Relationship," in *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, ed. by Thomas C. Heller et al. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 237-52.

## Singer's Idealization of Love: A Postscript

Marvin Kohl

"Caring Love and Liberty" was written in order to raise questions about the limits of paternalism and autonomy. I confess that I was unable to give a fully adequate analysis of these questions. Moreover, I have said relatively little about why caring love is preferable to weaker forms of benevolent love. There seem to be similar difficulties or questions with respect to other kinds of love, especially those in which the decision to love does not necessarily imply a commitment to help the beloved. But in so far as caring love is a subspecies of benevolent love, the former may be characterized as follows: in order for X to caringly love Y, X must cherish and desire (in the sense of being actively concerned about) the well-being and happiness of Y. This active concern involves a commitment to help Y when this help is necessary to protect important goods or prevent serious harms. Given the constituents of this relationship, X is required to help Y in certain circumstances if it proves necessary even if that help involves intervention. In other words, there are situations in which a love of this kind requires that one seek to alter the beloved in ways that are contrary to his or her own inclinations and desires. The caring nature of this love also requires that, when we interfere with the values or lifestyle of a beloved, we do so only because we intend and foresee his or her welfare, not because we are aiming at our own, or have some other overriding goal. From this perspective, to have reverence for a person as an end, not as a means, involves a concern about his or her welfare, and this is a larger concern than one limited to what a person may or may not consent to.

I share in the admiration commonly accorded to Singer's historical analysis and, largely because of this, I had hoped to be able to avoid a direct attack on his theory. However, it is not difficult for me to see, in retrospect, why Singer responded critically to my paper and has requested a less oblique analysis.

Polemics in philosophy often forgets the product and loses itself in battle. A view too commonly held is that, because explanations of love in relation to sentiments such as hatred, anger, benevolence, and caring are difficult to provide, it is prudent for philosophers of love to be content with disputation. There also is a tendency to stress the work a philosopher has not done rather than the work he has done. This, I hope, explains my initial reluctance to focus upon Singer's scattered statements about autonomy. In addition, there is a tendency, at least in analytic circles, to overlook the value of Singer's history of the philosophy of love, his analytical ingenuity and the importance of his insights into the nature and role of ideals.<sup>1</sup> For Singer himself limits the goals of his trilogy. Originally, it was limited to the task of drawing a distinction between two types of valuing—appraisal and bestowal—and explaining how each is relevant not only to love but also to the philosophy of love in the ancient, medieval, and modern world. He does not purport to offer a philosophical description of love in relation to other important sentiments. Nor does he pretend to offer a theory of love with developed arguments as to why we should accept another as he is in himself or as he happens to be, assuming that is what the beloved wants. But this claim forms a thread that runs throughout Singer's writings. Early in his study Singer suggests that a lover "will feel an intimate concern about the continuance of good properties in the beloved and the diminishing of bad ones." But in the same context where he raises the question of helping the beloved realize her potentialities, Singer adds, "assuming that is what she wants."<sup>2</sup>

Appraisal without bestowal may lead us to change other people regardless of what they want. . . . But this is not a loving attitude. . . . In loving another person, we respect *his* desire to improve himself. In offering to help we do so because he wants to be better than he is, not because we think he ought to be.<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, I find Singer's reply to Russell Vannoy not fully satisfying.<sup>4</sup> For one thing, the notion of having love accept the other *only as she wants to be* while also being concerned, not merely about her "indefeasible autonomy," but also about her multidimensional welfare needs, is problematic. For another, Singer's purported explanation seems to exacerbate the problem. To say that "in itself bestowal adds nothing to the appraisive value of the beloved." that bestowal "devotes itself to creating value *beyond* appearance," and to

conclude that "love is indeed an acceptance of another as she is in herself"—to my mind, isolates and mystifies the notion of bestowal.

To sum up: The negative claim is that *the bestowal of love does not seek to alter the object in ways that are alien or contrary to its own inclinations and desires*. The stronger claim is that *neither in the bestowing of, nor in being in, love is there warrant for intervention unless such an action is consented to*. It is not entirely clear from his writings which position Singer holds. But, given the conference discussion, I suspect it is the latter.

Singer seems to be a libertarian. Common to most variants of libertarianism is a core commitment to the inviolability of the individual and relatively unencumbered private property and autonomy rights. For the libertarian love may be important but what is more important and the overriding good, is the dignity and autonomy of the individual. Notice that Singer seems to believe not merely that appraisal may lead us to change other people regardless of what they want, but that in loving another person we should *only* respect his desires to improve himself. If we offer to help, we should do so *only* because he wants to be better than he is. Philosophically, what is objectionable is not that Singer is or appears to be a libertarian. For a libertarianism successfully explicated is an initially plausible alternative to other theories. What I find objectionable is that Singer systematically criticizes other thinkers for their unsupported idealizations but fails to provide the rational grounds for his own. What I find most disconcerting is the impression (perhaps adventitiously generated) that Singer is describing a neutral naturalism but one in which libertarian preferences, nonetheless, appear as self-evident truths.

Professor Singer correctly distinguishes between the type of joint dependence that is basically demeaning because each attempts to use the other selfishly, and the type of relationship defined in terms of interdependence. The former is a condition of mutual enslavement. But the latter, Singer writes, is a desirable mutuality.

As an expression of interpersonal needs, their love will cause them to rely on one another and to that extent they will be dependent. But their dependence will no longer feel the same, and indeed it will not be the same: it now belongs to a relationship in which each wants the welfare of the other rather than merely wanting selfish benefits. It is therefore a mutuality they can freely accept.<sup>5</sup>

Advocates of caring love also oppose the kind of enslavement that sounds more like pathological than healthy love. Like Singer they also cherish a relationship in which each wants (but not only wants) the welfare of the other. But appreciating the autonomy of a beloved is not necessarily the same as never intervening in their behalf unless one has consent. And one tends to

become suspicious of Singer's kind of "autonomy talk"—not only because it seems to reflect a male story as opposed to a woman's story of love, but because it fails to recognize that when it comes to a pluralistic welfare perspective, autonomy is not always trumps.

Dignity and autonomy are necessary conditions of the good life. An individual is said to have dignity to the extent that he or she has reasonable power to control important aspects of his or her own life. But dignity as self-possessed control does not require having total power; rather it consists in having reasonable control over the significant aspects of one's life. It consists in having a broader notion of welfare, one that understands that the best of personal relations is based upon caring for others and the enhancement of their dignity. For it is one thing to completely shatter the autonomy of an individual or irreparably damage his or her sense of self-worth. It is another to intervene without incurring such damage, especially if one does so only in vitally important matters and on the basis of fairly compelling evidence that it is really in behalf of the beloved's best interests.

Researchers are finding that the sense of being in control, and the desire for such control, are crucial aspects of the healthy and happy personality. Describing a study of convalescent home residents, Daniel Goleman writes that "increasing the sense of control among elderly men and women living in convalescent homes made them happier, increased their alertness and—perhaps most dramatically—lowered their mortality rate, over a period of 18 months, by 50 percent, compared with residents in the same homes who did not get the experiences of increased control."<sup>6</sup> Similarly, David Myers maintains that happy people believe they have personal control and choose their own destinies. He quotes, with favor, a survey reporting that "having a strong sense of controlling one's life is a more dependable predictor of positive feelings of well-being than any of the objective conditions of life we have considered."<sup>7</sup> "Although the behavioral sciences," Myers writes, "are sometime accused of undermining traditional values, the verdict of these studies is reassuring: people thrive best under conditions of democracy and personal freedom."<sup>8</sup> Obviously, the role played by a sense of control is a vital one. But this in itself is not an argument for never intervening in the life of a beloved. Nor do these studies remotely suggest that control is a sufficient condition for happiness and well-being. The fact that the welfare of an individual also involves meeting basic physical needs and developing traits such as self-esteem, optimism, and extroversion indicates that human beings often have to trade off some welfare considerations in order to obtain others.

Even if we admit that respect for a person qua person is paramount, it does not follow that we should accept a person as he or she wants to be. For a person typically has a future as well as a past and a present. Just as it seems to be incomplete to say that we should only love a person for

what he or she can be, it seems incomplete (and misleading) to say that we should only love a person as he or she wants to be, if reliable evidence indicates that what that person wants is contrary to his or her welfare in some deep and important way. Unless a person is completely blasted by the infirmities of existence or is at death's door, he or she always has a future offering a potential for growth. Respect for a person involves respect for this potential. Expressed differently: love for another person does not seem to be limited to caring for his or her "present self" but extends to the future and often involves considerations of a better or improved self. A person who caringly loves bestows value, not merely by caring about the present and immediate interests of the beloved, but also by caring about his or her long-range interests and growth potential.

Singer may object. He may urge that the inclinations and desires of adults, at least, *always* should be trump. But without argumentation, this is just libertarian presupposition or dogma. It assumes adults are much more rational than they really are and that they are *always* the best judge of what is in their own interests. This is not the place to parade the contrary evidence. But the literature on weakness of will and the nature of decision making, especially the studies of Ainslie and Kahneman and Tversky,<sup>9</sup> indicate that the beliefs of men in general are not formed on purely rational grounds.

I have suggested that much, if not the heart, of this dispute has to do with contrary views about the nature of welfare. There is a tension between believing that a lover ought to accept her beloved only as she wants to be and believing that lover ought to be actively concerned about her multi-dimensional needs. The issue, therefore, is not welfare versus nonwelfare concerns. It is much more subtle, having to do with whether a narrow notion of welfare in which autonomy is always dominant is preferable to one in which other needs or interests may be dominant. I have suggested that there is a kind of love the constituent nature of which requires that, in some situations, welfare interests other than autonomy take precedence. Aside from the question of whether I have created or described a commonly held ideal of love, there remains the intriguing question of how to rationally choose between these competing notions.

It would be both unfair and ungrateful to end without again acknowledging the value of Singer's analysis of the role of ideals. Rejection of Singer's libertarianism is compatible, I believe with a judicious acceptance of the process of idealization that, typically accompanies what lovers do to their beloved and also what philosophers do when they formulate theories about the nature of love. It is a matter of common experience that confusion and mistaken doctrine are sometimes connected with the failure to distinguish between prescriptive theories involving normative definitions and those which do not. Yet it may be part of the process of conceiving uplifting and transpersonal

ideals not to label them as such in order to avoid the process and perils of justification. Singer appears to be a lover of a libertarian ideal. He may suffer from the afflictions of this love; but, for Singer, that may be the chaff not the wheat. The wheat may have to do with the pervasiveness and importance of idealization. Thus Singer writes:

Idealization is not limited to our relations with human beings. It also occurs in philosophical reasoning. It almost seems to be a constant in the history of philosophy, particularly the philosophy of love. Whether they are defining the attitude or the ideal of love, whether they prefer a love of persons or things or ideals, whether they speak as self-conscious moralists or quasi-scientists—in almost all cases, philosophers have *created* one or another ideal of love by giving criteria abstracted from their own experience. However objective their analyses, they idealize what matters most to them as human beings surrounded by their own emotional bestowals.<sup>10</sup>

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1. This is not the place to extol the virtues of Singer's theory of ideals. It is a theory that begins in the trilogy and matures in his *Meaning of Life: The Creation of Value* (New York: Free Press, 1992). This book contains one of the best analyses of ideals. It includes such gems as:

For most people there is virtually no experience—not even a highly pleasurable one—that will seem meaningful unless it can be justified in terms of an ideal one has chosen. (p. 92) . . . [And that] throughout the varied pursuits that make a life significant, what remains constant is the growth of meaning when this involves creations of values in service of transpersonal ideals. (p. 117)

2. Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love*, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 9.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

4. Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love*, vol. 3 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 403–404.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 412.

6. Daniel Goleman, "Feelings of Control Viewed as Central in Mental Health," *New York Times*, Tuesday, October 7, 1986, C 1 and 11.

7. David G. Myers, *The Pursuit of Happiness* (New York: William Morrow, 1992), p. 113. Quoted from Angus Campbell, *The Sense of Well-Being in America* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 218–19.

8. Myers, *The Pursuit of Happiness*, p. 115.

9. See George Ainslie, "Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse Control," *Psychological Bulletin* 82:4 (1975): 463–96 and his "Beyond

Microeconomics: Conflict among Interests a Multiple Self as a Determinant of Value," in *The Multiple Self*, ed. by Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 133–75; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47:2 (1979): 263–91, and their "The Psychology of Preference," *Scientific American* 246 (1982): 160–73.

10. Singer, *The Nature of Love*, 1:42.

## 15

**Can Scientists Make Love?****Stanley G. Clarke**

About eight years ago, I read an article in a reputable science magazine titled "Love Is Blue." Here it was claimed that love could be identified with a certain chemical that photographed blue under certain standard conditions. Although, I was not at the time in a love-depleted stage of life myself, I was filled with a momentary sense of optimism for others. "Scientists can make love," I exclaimed. But, alas, being a philosopher, my mind was soon consumed with questions before I could even tell my love-starved friends the good news. What, I worried, would love be like if blue dye-injected persons did not express their state lyrically in the languages of love: sweet talk, poetry, and song? Whatever love is, it is too intimately related to its expression to be identified with anything that might not lead to the appropriate sort of expressiveness. And I mean not something that could be neutrally described as "behavior," but an expression of meaning through metaphorical language indicating a different way of being.

There is a tension in all of us that the ambiguities of the question "Can scientists make love?" brings into focus. Many of us will have a secret hope that there might someday be love clinics in the same sense as there are reproduction clinics today, where technology, and not talk therapy, would be the means of renewal. Yet we have a strong tendency to deny that scientists will ever make love just because of the other obvious, voyeuristic sense of the question. That is, "Can scientists be poetically engaged with their lovers in a manner that will bring erotic fulfillment?" It is just this expressive side of love which we are sure scientists cannot make as professionals although

they may be exceedingly proficient amateurs. And it is also this expressiveness of love which has brought some to question whether scientists can make love in a third sense—namely, can they make a model, a theory of love? Irving Singer gives one answer to this question: "We are nowhere near the point where scientists can expect to formulate a unified comprehensive theory. But we are making progress and there is no need to despair about future possibilities" (3:345). This is an answer I wish to challenge.

In this paper I hope to ease some of the tension about these ambiguities by providing an intellectual framework within which I think answers to the above questions are best formulated. I also hope to go some way in showing what scientists can and cannot do and why. Briefly, my answers will be as follows. Since I am not much of a voyeur, whether scientists can fulfill themselves erotically is a question to which I am content to answer, "Probably." More seriously, I will try to show that parts of love are such that scientists could in principle technologically make them. All the same, we cannot turn to science for a comprehensive theory of love just because love is, in the end, a process that is historical and not strictly natural.

To set the framework in which love should be discussed, I think that it is profitable to return to the Aristotelian pursuit of determining how to categorize objects of inquiry. We should ask, "What sort of a thing is love?" in a general sense, of course, love is a certain kind of capacity, or disposition. More particularly, however, we need to know what kind of capacity by looking at the sort of way in which love is manifest.

Much discussion about love is conducted in a manner that assumes that realized love is a state for which one can attempt to give a definition in terms of something like necessary and sufficient conditions. The debate between Singer and Alan Soble on how appraisal is to be characterized in relation to love seems to me to be a case in point. Singer claims that appraisals are necessary conditions for love but not constituents or part of the definition (1:13). Soble argues that they must be seen as constituents (Soble:23). To my mind, the argument between these two is marred by assuming that love is a state.

If love is categorized as a process, that particular type of debate between Singer and Soble is shortcircuited and will move to substantive issues such as the role of appraisals in love. A process is a series of events which has a beginning, a middle, and an end. A process need not be what I would call a rigid process, such as the process of fermentation, which begins in one way only, with a specific developmental structure resulting in only one goal. There are things we would call "processes" which are multi-originated and multi-ended. Education, for instance, would be one such process. It may begin in different ways and we have no agreed-upon end of education, but all would accept that some goals are achieved. Love is analogous to education in these ways.

The grounds for categorizing love as a process are good Aristotelian ones of looking at the sorts of questions one can ask about love. Basically, the fact that we can ask about beginnings and fulfillments of love indicates that we are speaking of a process. However, we also describe love as something that takes time, is never complete at any moment, and has a direction in that different moments cannot change their place in time without changing the identity of that love. Love, like education, is a process that has many origins and many goals.

One of the implications of taking love to be a nonrigid process is that it shows that the search for a definition of love in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions is out of place. Singer, as we have already seen, uses that terminology in his account. And Soble who does not attempt to provide a definition of love, still assumes such a framework. When he specifies some derivative features of love, he writes:

Conceiving of personal love as axiomatically, constitutively, or by definition constant, exclusive, or reciprocal, or insisting that only genuine personal love is any of these is a mistake: these features must be viewed as derivative. (Soble:17)

Accounts of processes, especially nonrigid ones, move us out of the search for necessary conditions. This is because the name of a process can legitimately be applied even when only parts of the process have occurred. The beginning of education is education just as any other part of the process is, and the same is true of love. The search for necessary conditions tends to encourage one to identify love with only one part of the whole. Furthermore, various stages of a process can be abnormally caused by starting the process at the middle or near the end. In this case, the search for necessary conditions that would appear in a definition cannot but fail. Thus, the best we can hope for in the description of a process is the identification of what normally occurs and how the elements are normally related. This means that we should turn away from conceptual analysis and look at what various accounts of love—biological, psychological, historical, and interpretive—reveal. Such a framework will displace the question of whether love is erosive (requiring appraisals) or agapeic (needing only bestowals) from one of definitional doctrine to a search for whether there are such roles in the process of love. The same love might be both erosive and agapeic if love is a process. The goal of our understanding would, then, have to be discovering how these elements are related.

In the end, I shall argue that love is a historical process. Its historicity is largely what accounts for its being a nonrigid process and an inappropriate candidate for a comprehensive scientific theory. However, that does

not imply that science can tell us nothing about love. There can be processes within processes and some of these may be amenable to a scientific account.

Assuming that love is a process, I hope that we can now answer quite clearly the question of what science can tell us about love. First of all, it is worth looking at one scientific account of the emotions which implies that a comprehensive scientific theory of love can be given. This is the theory of social constructionism. It is broadly, at least, a scientific theory in that it appeals to social causation by explaining the occurrence of emotions in terms of their role in attaining social goals such as preserving morality or supporting culturally approved values. There are two versions of social constructionism: strong and weak. The strong version asserts that emotions are intrinsically functional and depend for their existence on serving a social function (Armon-Jones:61). This version seems implausible in that studies of emotion in infants and animals would appear to justify the claim that there are some nonsocialized emotions. I agree with Claire Armon-Jones in her article "The Social Functions of Emotion" that the weak version is the more plausible thesis. This version is that social function is the main determinant in the existence and explanation of a significant class of emotions (Armon-Jones:61). On this view, love would be a plausible candidate for a constructionist account.

Although I would not reject an explanation of some emotional phenomena by social function, we need to be clear about what is required by such an explanation. And this will show us how this explanation is limited with regard to emotion, especially love. Explanation by social function is not the same as explaining the occurrence or spread of some practice by appeal to education. In the latter case, the goals can be vague and the practices for reaching them relatively plastic, leaving significant room for creativity, and therefore unpredictability, in their exercise. Explanation by social function, on the other hand, to be scientifically supportable, requires that the social function, as well as the role of the emotion in attaining it, be clearly specifiable. This can be achieved only in cases where emotions are rigidly structured. They are set for attaining a specific goal by a specific route. And, of course, there are emotional phenomena of this type. One example from Armon-Jones's paper makes this clear. "Hatred of Jews" appears to be a paradigm for functional explanation of the weak version. Although hatred may have many natural features, the main determinant of hatred of Jews would appear to be social function. As Armon-Jones writes:

For example, while "anti-semitism" was based on the belief that Jews are bad, this belief was itself crucially related to the value imposed by Nazis upon the Aryan ideal. Here it can be argued that the "hatred" in question was not merely warranted but was regarded by members of the Nazi com-

munity as a desirable response in its role of vindicating the Aryan ideal and the agent's commitment to, and endorsement of, this value. This role of "hatred" is substantiated by the fact that agents were condemned, and in some cases punished, for failing to express strong contempt for Jews. (Arrmon-Jones:72-73)

Here we have a rigidly structured emotion. Its object is both abstractly and rigidly described in the terms "Jewish" and "evil." The possible expressions of the emotion are narrowly constituted as well—exhibiting contempt and doing harm. Here both the goal and the role of the emotion are clearly specifiable in a manner that suits explanation by social function. Since hatred tends to be rigidly structured, it is open to the influence of social determination.

Many emotional phenomena are not rigidly structured and simply aid in bringing into play certain types of intelligent, and thereby flexible, behavior in certain contexts. Fear, for example, can be rigidly structured, especially in the case of phobias. However, there are many instances of people being motivated to deal responsively and creatively with danger. In the case of love, the situation is similar. The goals of love and the motivated behavior of lovers are too open, flexible, and unpredictable to satisfy the requirements of functional explanation. This is not to deny, however, that some loves may best be explained by social function. There are social stereotypes of love that are sometimes manifest all too directly in the lives of some lovers, but that is exactly when we throw the motivation of these lovers into question. Some loves may be social constructs, but we judge them as being deficient just insofar as they are. We make this judgment on the basis of ordinary love which is open and flexible in a manner that is not susceptible to explanation by social function. Thus, I think it is clear that social constructionism does not afford us a comprehensive theory of love.

Sociobiology, however, is taken by some to be a more promising route to a scientific account of love. Initially, the relevance of sociobiology seemed to be more a threat than an aid since it appeared to rule out the possibility of genuinely altruistic behavior in humans. More recently, there is general agreement that this is not so. Laurence Thomas, in *Living Morally*, makes the case quite clearly that sociobiology is committed to a connection between unwitting altruism and unwitting selfishness. However, this does not imply that motive altruism is biologically impossible. Singer comes to the same conclusion on different grounds: "... the sociobiologists can only establish that self-sacrificial behavior frequently serves to protect one's genes" (3:359).

However, sociobiology can be pushed further. Both Laurence Thomas and Sydney Mellen have formulated rather speculative theories to show that love is actually biologically selected for. In the case of Thomas, the love in question is what he identifies as parental love which is transparent, whereas

Mellen gives an evolutionary backing for a type of romantic love (Singer, 3:365). I will concentrate mainly on Thomas since I am not as interested in the soundness of their speculative claims as I am in understanding what sort of things such theories would tell us about love. To understand this, Thomas's focus upon transparent love is significant. According to him, transparent love is one

... that consists of a concern for a person's well-being and is not tied to the person's performances. This is unconditional love not because one may never cease to have such love for an individual, but because there is no belief about that individual's behavior, performances, or what have you, that constitutes a conceptual bar to so loving that person, there is nothing a person can do, nothing a person can become, that would cause one, on conceptual grounds, to cease loving him. (Thomas:60)

Thomas's argument that such love has been biologically selected for is basically the following. Psychological security is basic to the survival of humans. Parental love that is transparent is conducive to security in the child. Thus, transparent parental love serves directly a survival need and is plausibly thought to have been selected for.

This argument leaves something to be desired, since the fact that a feature of human beings serves a survival need does not prove that that particular feature was selected for. That feature may be a socially developed form of some more general capacity for which biological selection operated.

Nevertheless, an interesting issue arises here about the sort of motives that can most plausibly be given a biological grounding. It would seem that these would have to be motives that are, in the language of cognitive science, "cognitively impenetrable." Types of mental activity are cognitively impenetrable when they cannot be directly affected by changes in one's beliefs and attitudes (Fodor:47-101). Reflexes would be the clearest examples of cognitively impenetrable behavior. No matter how much I trust you not to touch my eyeball, I am still going to blink when you point your finger close to my eye. Perception, too, appears to contain some levels of activity that are cognitively impenetrable. Could you see my blue pen as green, for instance, just by changing your beliefs and attitudes? The feelings of hunger and thirst are examples of motives that appear to be cognitively impenetrable. You can, perhaps, turn your attention from them, but you cannot change them directly by manipulating your own beliefs and attitudes.

We can now formulate two important questions given the distinction between cognitively penetrable and impenetrable mental activity: (1) Does sociobiology apply plausibly only to the impenetrable? (2) if so, what does that imply about Thomas's case for the biological selection of transparent

love? The answer to the first question is that to the degree that any mental item is penetrable, it is open to the influence of thought and, therefore, judgmental decision in a manner that leaves the behavior of that item indeterminate, hence explainable in nonbiological terms. If cognitive impenetrability is a requirement for what can be biologically explained, what is the status of transparent love?

Laurence Thomas, at least, is not clear about the status of such love when he comments:

What I have called transparent love, or something very much like it, is thought to be one of the defining features of Christianity. And observe that while the Christian commandment to love one's enemies is regarded as exceedingly difficult, doing so is not ruled out on conceptual grounds. (Thomas:60)

A love that can be commanded is, of course, a cognitively penetrable love and is not capable of biological explanation. However, this comment about Christian love does not really square with Thomas's account of transparent love which, I think, implies that it is cognitively impenetrable. You might recall that transparent love is such that "... there is nothing a person can do, nothing a person can become, that would cause one, on conceptual grounds, to cease loving him" (Thomas:60). Furthermore, when Thomas turns to explain how parental love generates love in children, he appeals to the principle of reciprocity which is that "... we become disposed to act favorably toward those who act favorably to us" (Thomas:83). This is a principle which is characterized as operating without cognitive mediation. Of course, one will cognitively process how one is going to deal with the tendencies this disposition raises in one, but that is processing *about* the disposition, not *within* it. So it seems to me that Thomas should characterize the transparent love which he wishes to ground biologically as a cognitively impenetrable mechanism, or module. Humans are such complex creatures, however, that the activation of transparent love does not determine one's behavior. We can decide to kill our loves, just as we might drown our sorrows or suppress our appetites. None of this is done directly by changing beliefs, but indirectly by employing other causal means such as different environments, alcohol, or pills.

I am still not convinced of the sociobiological account of specific capacities such as transparent love. Nevertheless, the important thing in this context is to realize that, even if true, sociobiology does not provide us with a comprehensive theory of love but explains the continued existence of some elements of the whole complex process of love. More importantly, it raises the question of whether there might be many modular aspects to love—mechanisms which are cognitively impenetrable but which generate products that are taken up into the whole love story. I think that recent work on

emotion makes this plausible and indicates one of the main areas in which science can be of theoretical and practical help in understanding love. The other main area is describing the developmental and structural relations between emotions which operate regardless of how we think about them.

Many are tempted to take "falling in love" itself as a mechanism that would satisfy this project. However, I think that would be a mistake. Falling in love is itself a complex state which can take time and be changed significantly by critical reflection. However, we would be too hasty if we jumped to the conclusion that there are no mechanisms involved. Progress in the study of falling in love will require the sort of detailed analysis of the phenomenon that generated progress in study of emotions through facial expression. In fact, there are some plausibly mechanistic activities connected with falling in love. These include fixation of attention, wanting to be near the beloved, and imaginative embellishment. For anyone who has been in love, these elements will at least seem to be cognitively impenetrable ones. Although I can learn to deal with each, that is done by manipulating myself and my surroundings so as to try to cause a change in them. It is not by directly thinking myself out of any one of them. If science can tell us anything about love, it will be partly about such mechanisms as these.

The other area in which science appears to be capable of contributing to understanding emotions, love in particular, is that of structural relations between them. For example, as Jon Elster writes:

The cessation of an emotional state—be it positive or negative—does not simply bring us back to the earlier emotional plateau. Rather, it tends to generate another emotional state of opposite sign. Consider a person who has just discovered a lump in her breast and is extremely anxious. Upon hearing from her doctor that there is no possibility of cancer, her mood for a while turns euphoric before she returns to an affectively neutral state. (Elster:65)

These sorts of structural relations are also likely in the case of love. Singer reports the view of Melanie Klein that love and hate are dialectically related so that you cannot have one without the other (3:353). Although Klein's theory may not be strictly scientific, post-Freudian theories like it, along with personal experience and historical accounts, suggest that a generalization linking love and hate upon some structural basis is probably sound. Awareness of such structural relations will help people get rid of such unrealistic and self-defeating ideals as a love life with only happy emotions.

It is not my business here to give the content of a scientific account of these various aspects of love. I argue only that science can give an explanation of these sorts of elements and features of love. Understanding these items



as natural ones that simply happen to us and can be accounted for by science is part of a humanistic understanding of love of the sort that Singer describes as his goal. It allows humans to live less guilt-ridden lives and to refrain from running from them before their time is up just because they exhibit features that are there naturally. Nevertheless, science can only provide us with accounts of these various, relatively mechanistic aspects of love. It cannot give us a complete theory of love, and that is because love is not only a process but a historical process—the feature to which we shall now turn.

Irving Singer tends to find the limitations of scientific accounts of love in the bestowals which he takes to be its defining feature. This is because they involve the use of imagination to be creative and invent new values. Partly because I think the notion of bestowal is itself one that applies only within certain historical formations of love, and partly because it is not obvious that psychology will be unable to give a scientific account of creative imagination, I prefer to explain the limitations of science here by an appeal to certain features of love as historical.

The two features that I will mention are contingency and dynamic interaction. Contingency characterizes love in that accidentally generated coincidences can be significant determinants in the course of any love. This contingency works at the very beginning in that you simply happened to meet this particular person. But it also continues through the process of loving. It just happens that you are depressed about other events in your life at the moment that you happen to see your love interest again. And it just happens that your love takes your demeanor to be about that love. Everything would have gone smoothly but for the fortuitous coincidence of two different causal sequences. Love is, through and through, day by day, riddled with contingency. That is what makes the beginning, process, and fulfillment of love radically unpredictable and scientifically intractable. The second feature is that of dynamic interaction between the two lovers. Amelie Rorty describes this feature in "The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes."

There is a kind of love—and for some it may be the only kind that qualifies as true love—that is historical precisely because it does not (oh so wonderfully) rigidly designate its object. The details of such love change with every change in the lover and the friend. . . . Having been transformed by loving, the lover perceives the friend in a new way and loves in a new way. (French, Uehling, Wettstein:402)

Describing the historicity of psychological attitudes in general, she writes:

These psychological attitudes are identified by the detail of the narrative of the interactions between the subject and the object, interactions that also individuate the persons involved. (ibid.:402)

The changing identities of both the loves and the lovers also make any attempt at a scientific theory of such processes impossible. The generalizations that we can make are severely limited by these transforming identities.

These historical features of love guarantee that no complete, or even general, scientific theory of love will be forthcoming. Nevertheless, significant historical writing about love can help us understand it in a general way. I would like briefly to show how Irving Singer has done some of this sort of historical writing even though he does not characterize it in that way.

When Singer gives his account of three states of love, he characterizes what he is doing as describing three states of experience:

Much of what we mean by romantic passion is exemplified by the experience known as "falling in love." But we must contrast two other states, both compatible with marriage, which I shall call "being in love" and—staying in love. (3:383)

"Experience" is a tricky word here. For Singer and his pragmatist approach, it includes both psychological states and actions. This inclusive use of "experience" tends to blur the fact that actions have a historical character and, I think, this is what permits Singer to be so hopeful about a comprehensive scientific theory of love. Seeing love as experience, he ignores its historicity and, therefore, intractability for science. However, if we look at how Singer describes being in love and staying in love, it is clear that he is sketching stages of a historical process. They are not just descriptions of psychological states since they involve actions. Singer indicates how activities are involved in these stages:

Being in love begins the process of reorientation, the actual making of the new world. (3:384)

And, with respect to staying in love, he writes:

Consider the bond between a man and woman who have spent many years in each other's company, each attending to the other's needs with recurrent and reciprocating concern. (3:388)

The only state that Singer discusses in purely experiential terms is "falling in love," which he describes as follows:

Falling in love is volcanic. It is a phenomenon of great emotional stress.  
(3:384)

This seems to me to be mistaken. Even falling in love is just one stage in the history of a love and itself includes actions and not just experiencing—though it may, of course, begin by the activation of some of those love modules, or mechanisms, mentioned earlier.

To support my case, I will appeal to the sensitive rendering of love's blossoming in Turgenev's novelette *First Love*. The description of Vladimir's first seeing of Zinaida is as follows:

The young men offered their foreheads so eagerly, and there was in the girl's movements (I saw her in profile) something so enchanting, imperious and caressing, so mocking and charming, that I nearly cried out with wonder and delight, and should, I suppose, at that moment, have given everything in the world to have those lovely fingers tap my forehead too. My rifle slipped to the grass; I forgot everything; my eyes devoured the graceful figure, the lovely neck, the beautiful arms, the slightly dishevelled fair hair under the white kerchief—and the half-closed, perceptive eyes, the lashes, the soft cheek beneath them. . . . (Turgenev:26)

Neither Turgenev nor the character Vladimir identifies this fixation of attention as "falling in love." It takes a few days of activity before Vladimir is ready to talk about the beginning of his love, or his falling in love.

From that day my "passion" began. What I experienced then, I remember, was something similar to what a man must feel when first given an official post. I had ceased to simply be a young boy; I was someone in love. I say that my passion began from that day; and I might add that my suffering began on that day too. (Turgenev:52)

"Being given an official post" is the analogy Turgenev uses to elucidate the falling in love which begins Vladimir's new passion. This analogy indicates that even falling in love is not just an experience but has the complexity of taking on a role. Such taking-on is an action that can be done all at once or gradually, intelligently or stupidly. And however one falls in love, that falling will exhibit history and not just feeling.

Singer's classification of the states of "falling in love," "being in love," and "staying in love" are best understood as a classification of three historical stages of the process of love. They are the same sort of historical terms as Kuhn uses in describing science as containing stages of crisis, revolutionary science and normal science. Writing about love in these terms is just like writing any explanatory history and can be justified in the same manner.

Given that science cannot give us a comprehensive account of love, it is to such histories and to literature that we must turn. Literature will give us pictures of what we may choose to realize historically. They may be harmful and oppressive pictures if they take no cognizance of the humanity that must realize them—a humanity that must accept its own passivity exercised through psychological mechanisms of various sorts, including those that are near the heart of love.

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